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In the Battle of Winchester
The summer of 1864 was a season of gloomy dis­
couragement for the North. Practically nothing 
decisive had been accomplished since the fall of 
Vicksburg and the Battle of Gettysburg. Gradually 
troops had been concentrated in the East and when 
the spring opened it had seemed that the cry, “ On 
to Richmond”, was about to be realized at last. 
But the hardest blows that Grant could deliver 
about Petersburg and Richmond were repulsed, 
while Lee, with consummate generalship, was able 
to dispatch a corps of his best troops under General 
Jubal A. Early to the very suburbs of Washington 
in July. Failing to capture the national capital, the 
Confederates retreated across the Potomac where 
they continued to be a source of anxiety for more 
than three months.
Lying just beyond the lofty Blue Ridge of Vir­
ginia was the rich Valley of the Shenandoah. 
Though subordinate to the main theater of military 
activities east of the mountains, the Valley of Vir- 
ginia, as it was also called, played an important role 
during the whole drama of the war, both as an 
avenue of invasion and a granary for the subsistence 
of Southern armies. By moving northward down 
the friendly valley to the Potomac River, a Confed­
erate force could penetrate sixty miles north and in
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the rear of Washington, as “ Stonewall” Jackson 
had done in 1862, or march into Pennsylvania, as Lee 
had done the following summer. The source of so 
many Union disasters deserved to be called the Val­
ley of Humiliation. Moreover, when Confederate 
forces occupied the valley their horses fattened on 
its forage and the men feasted on the best the coun­
try afforded, while in quitting the valley on an 
invasion of the North the commissaries filled their 
wagons from the farms and storehouses. A large 
population of Dunkards and Quakers, whose reli­
gious scruples kept them out of the army, were none 
the less hostile to the Union so that as producers of 
food and clothing they were hardly of less military 
value than an equal number of combatants.
To the Shenandoah Valley General Early with­
drew about the middle of July, 1864, apparently on 
his way to join Lee in Richmond. But when several 
divisions of the pursuing Federal troops were 
ordered back to "Washington the crafty Confederate 
turned suddenly upon General George Crook, drove 
him back to H arper’s Ferry, and again advanced 
into Maryland. A raiding party sent into Pennsyl­
vania burned the town of Chambersburg.
Obviously something had to be done to prevent 
such incursions north of the Potomac. Grant 
hastened to Washington and began the concentra­
tion of troops for a campaign into the Shenandoah 
Valley which Early was planning to hold until after 
harvest at least. The brilliant General Philip II.
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Sheridan, then only thirty-three years old, was 
chosen to command the reorganized army. It was 
his task to occupy the valley, seize or destroy ruth­
lessly all the horses, cattle, and food supplies, 
devastate the Garden of Virginia so that “ a crow 
flying’ over the country would need to carry his ra­
tions” , and thus end the danger of future Confed­
erate invasions from that source.
After a month of fruitless maneuvering, Sheridan 
found an opportunity to strike an effective blow. 
Early’s forces, seriously weakened by the transfer 
of a division to aid in the defense of Richmond, were 
strung along the pike between Winchester and 
Martinsburg. On the eve of a decisive battle one 
division lay across the Berryville Pike two miles 
east of Winchester, another was at Stephenson’s 
Depot five miles north on the Martinsburg Pike, a 
third division was hurrying southward on the same 
road, General John B. Gordon with his division was 
at Bunker’s Hill fifteen miles away, while the cav­
alry was at Martinsburg twenty-two miles north of 
Winchester.
Opposed to this force Sheridan had about thirty- 
seven thousand effectives in line between Clifton 
and Berryville about ten miles east of Winchester. 
The Union forces consisted chiefly of three divisions 
of the veteran Sixth Army Corps, the Army of West 
Virginia composed of two small divisions under 
General Crook, three divisions of cavalry, and two 
divisions from the Nineteenth Army Corps com-
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manded by General William II. Emory, a veteran 
who had graduated from West Point the year Sheri­
dan was born.
In the Army of the Shenandoah were three Iowa 
regiments, all in the Second Division of Emory’s 
corps commanded by General Cuvier Grover. The 
Twenty-second Iowa Infantry was in the Second 
Brigade under Colonel Edward L. Molineux, while 
the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-eighth Iowa were in 
the Fourth Brigade with Colonel David Sliunk in 
command. Recruited in the summer of 1862, these 
regiments had been seasoned by two winters of 
onerous campaigning in Arkansas and Louisiana, 
had participated in the siege of Vicksburg, and had 
engaged in fighting so deadly at Champion’s Hill 
that over thirty-seven per cent of the effective men 
in the Twenty-fourth Iowa were killed or wounded. 
In July, 1864, they were sent East by sea, and 
August found the intrepid Iowans skirmishing up 
and down the Shenandoah Valley.
By three o’clock in the morning of September 19th 
Sheridan’s army was out of its intrenched position 
and on the march along the Berryville Pike toward 
Opequan Creek about five miles east of Winchester. 
At the head of the column went the veteran Sixth 
Corps, followed by the Nineteenth, with Crook’s 
divisions last. Across Opequan Creek the road fol­
lowed a narrow ravine winding among heavily 
wooded hills for a distance of nearly two miles. 
Beyond lay an irregular, undulating valley, faced on
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the south and west by an amphitheatre of stony 
heights occupied by the Confederates.
To move twenty or thirty thousand infantry 
troops a distance of seven miles, ford a stream, and 
file through a gorge along a single road took time. 
It was fully four hours after the cavalry carried the 
first Confederate works at five o ’clock in the morn­
ing before the infantry arrived, and it was close to 
noon before the Nineteenth Corps, delayed by an 
ammunition train, finally got through the congested 
ravine. “ The road was crowded with artillery, 
ammunition wagons, and ambulances, all hurrying 
forward” , wrote an officer. On each side “ a line of 
infantry in column of march stumbled over the 
rocky, guttered ground, and struggled through the 
underbrush. The multitudes of men who belong to 
an army, yet who do not fight — the cooks, the musi­
cians, the hospital attendants, the quarter-masters’ 
and commissaries’ people, the sick, and the skulkers 
— sat on every rock and under every bush, watching 
us pass.” By the time the head of the column 
emerged from the ravine and swung to the left Early 
had been able to concentrate practically his whole 
army at Winchester, and throw a considerable force 
into the valley facing the ravine.
Sheridan’s plan of battle, after it was too late to 
destroy the enemy in isolated units as he had hoped, 
was to deploy in the valley, keep the enemy’s right 
engaged, fight vigorously in the center, and turn the 
left so as to execute a flank movement, gain the rear,
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and nullify the advantage of the Confederate posi­
tion on the heights. The object of Early was to 
allow part of Sheridan’s men to deploy, drive hack 
the attacking columns upon the advancing troops, 
and during the resulting confusion to push his 
strong left wing forward to the mouth of the gorge 
and thus cut off retreat. For the Northern army 
the battle of Winchester was to be either a splendid 
victory or annihilation, for it would be impossible in 
case of defeat to escape on the Berryville Pike 
through the gorge. Success or failure was to de­
pend upon the ability of the Nineteenth Army Corps 
to repulse the Confederates at the center and hold 
the ground at all hazards until Crook’s divisions 
could get through the ravine and sweep to the right 
on the more brilliant mission of turning the hostile 
position.
The Iowa troops in Grover’s division emerged 
from the defile about eleven o’clock and moved for­
ward in perfect order. “ Steep hills and a thick 
wood, impracticable for artillery until engineered, 
rendered it necessary for the infantry to open the 
contest without the support of cannon. In face of a 
vigorous shelling the column swept over the hills, 
struggled through the wood, and emerged upon a 
broad stretch of rolling fields, on the other side of 
which lay the rebel force, supported by another 
wood and by a ledge of rocks, which answered the 
purpose of a fortification, with the semicircular 
heights of Winchester in the rear, as a final rallying
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base.”  With a charge of unusual impetuosity, the 
skirmishers firing as they ran, Grover’s men of the 
Second Division carried the wood with a rush and 
hurried on pell-mell, driving the enemy three hun­
dred yards beyond. The Iowa troops were in the 
thick of the fight.
But such a vehement advance is liable to sudden 
reverse when it reaches a strong second line. From 
a sheltered position an overwhelming mass of infan­
try arose in front of the charging brigades, fired a 
stunning volley, and moved irresistibly forward 
against the disorganized Union men. For a time 
they fought desperately at close quarters and clung 
stubbornly to their position, but the Confederate 
onslaught was too powerful. “ The bloody but 
victorious advance was changed into a bloody and 
ominous retreat.” The already disorganized troops 
fell back in utter confusion.
To retreat in the immediate presence of a power­
ful enemy is the most demoralizing maneuver that 
an army can be required to execute. “ There is no 
inspiriting return of blow for blow; there is impos­
sibility of quelling the hostile fire by an answering 
fire; the soldier marches gloomily in his file, imagin­
ing that his foe is ever gaining on him; the ranks 
are rapidly thinned, and the organization of the 
companies shattered; and thus from both physical 
and moral causes, the bravest battalions go to 
pieces.” So it was in the battle of Winchester. 
Men crowded up the Berryville Pike, while to the
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right and left the fields were dotted with fugitives 
rushing to the cover of the timber. Some of the 
regimental organizations disappeared for the time 
being. Steadily Early’s veterans advanced with 
yells of triumph and murderous musketry, threaten­
ing to rout Sheridan’s army before the battle had 
fairly begun. Generals and brigade commanders 
rode hither and thither endeavoring by threats, 
commands, and entreaties to halt and reform the 
panic-stricken stragglers. “ It was the bloodiest, 
the darkest, the most picturesque, the most dra­
matic, the only desperate moment of the day.”
In contrast to the general panic one instance of 
coolness and discipline was conspicuous. Through 
the midst of the confusion came Captain William T. 
Rigby with Company B of the Twenty-fourth Iowa 
Infantry, “ all marching as composedly as if return­
ing from drill.”
“ Captain, you are not going to retreat any 
further, I hope” , called an artillery officer who was 
trying to rally the fleeing soldiers.
“ Certainly not” , replied Rigby, “ Halt, front! 
Three cheers, men; hip, hip, hurrah!”
The little band cheered lustily — the first note of 
defiance that broke the desperate monotony of the 
panic. It stopped the retreat in that part of the 
field. In a few minutes Captain Rigby’s company 
had swelled to a battalion of men from half a dozen 
regiments determined to hold their ground. The 
rally spread and the Confederate attack was
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checked. Piece by piece the shattered Union line 
was reestablished and most of the lost ground was 
recovered.
Then followed the long hours of holding on in the 
face of terrific fire until the left of E arly’s line 
could be forced back. How well the Nineteenth 
Corps performed its portion of the task is shown by 
the list of killed and wounded numbering nearly 
two thousand. “ Swept by musketry and artillery 
from the right, pressed violently by the one grand 
column of attack which Early massed to decide the 
battle, it bled, but it stood, and, after hours of suf­
fering, advanced. ” By sundown the battle was won 
and Early’s army was fleeing down the Winchester 
Pike toward Cedar Creek and Fisher’s Hill.
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